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(4) Jurisdiction 
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3 
(2)(j), which states "(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: .... (j) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." 
(5) Issues for Review with citation to standard of review and preservation of the 
issue in the record. 
5.1 Did the court improperly convert a motion under Rule 12(b) to a Rule 56 
motion without notice and an ability to gather evidence? 
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 
10, a t t6and^8: 
\6 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's reference to the 
motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, as well as its 
failures to exclude matters outside the pleadings and to properly 
convert the motion into one for summary judgment, warrant 
reversal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(c). "If a court does not 
exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a 
rale 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is 
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without 
considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT I0l,1fl2, 104 P.3d 1226. The propriety 
of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law we review 
for correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are 
appropriate only where the court concludes that the plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, after 
accepting all the factual allegations made in the complaint as 
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. See id. 
f 8 Plaintiffs claim that, in dismissing the case, the trial 
court improperly considered material outside the pleadings. If a 
court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion 
into one for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This 
rule 12(b) conversion process includes giving the parties 
reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary 
judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.; 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996); 
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements 
are especially important with respect to the party against whom 
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judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that 
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 
material is particularly important). Our rules provide that 
complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to crossclaims, 
as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the 
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings 
"include[s] any written or oral evidence . . . which . . . 
substantiates] . . . and does not merely reiterate what is said 
in the pleadings." Oakwood Vill., 2004 UT 101 at ^12 (second, 
third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
This issue was preserved by way of objection and motion to continue the hearing 
to get the subpoena results from a relevant witness, see transcript p 16 lines 13 to 
page 17 line 15 and also page 18 line 17 to page 19 line 8. 
5.2 Did the court enter a Judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings when the 
pleadings were not closed and now answer was filed? 
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 
10, at Tf6(quoted in full above) and ^|7: 
Tf7 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for 
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court 
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, 
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to 
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer 
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the 
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A 
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone 
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating 
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been 
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as 
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for 
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6).! 
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This issue was not preserved, as the court raised this issue for the first time 
when it docketed it's Judgment as "05-29-07 Filed judgment: Judgment on 
Pleading" As there was no opportunity to respond to an answer, or even advanced 
notice that the judgment was "on the pleading" this issue should be reviewed at the 
appellate level. 
5.3 Did the Court allow an affirmative defense of "proper purpose" and res-
judicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process claim on Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion ? 
The standard of review is found in Tucker V. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. 2002 UT 54 further quoting Gill v. Timm, which notes that 
"affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings and are usually 
waived if not so pleaded." (citations omitted). 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 
1986): 
7 Gill recites the general rule that affirmative defenses should be set 
forth in responsive pleadings. Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the 
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the 
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 
1990) (emphasis added),(2) this general rule recognizes that 
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the 
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at page 472 of the record, at [^6 in Petitioner's 
Rule 52 and 59 motion and at trial page 57 line 25 through page 58 line 14. 
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5.4 Should dismiss have been without prejudice based upon the pleadings? 
The standard of review is quoted above in Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, at ^ 6. 
In a dismissal based upon Rule 12(b), which has not been converted on full and 
fair notice to a Rule 56 motion, the dismissal should be without prejudice to other 
claims, causes of action, or pleadings being raised by motion for leave to amend. 
This issue was preserved at trial at Transcript page 46 lines 6-11. 
5.5 Was an award of attorney's fees appropriate given the court must make factual 
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, not Defendant. 
The standard of review is found in To quote Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36, 
996 P.2d 1081 which states: 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint 
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support 
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question 
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253. 
This issue was preserved on page 472 of the record, f 7 in the Rule 52 and 59 
motion ruled upon by the Court and at trial in transcript as argued in section 9.4. 
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5.5 Was Summary Judgment against Plaintiff under Rule 56 appropriate? 
The standard of review for the granting of the motion to dismiss in this 
case is given by Ellsworth v. Lowell 2006 UT 77 f^l 1-12: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Tfl 1 While Lowell moved to dismiss Mr. Ellsworth's complaint 
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2006). Because "affidavits or other evidence" 
were presented to, and not excluded by, the district court, we 
review that court's decision as a summary judgment. DOIT, Inc. 
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 (Utah 1996). 
If 12 "[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents for 
review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases 
decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes." 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). 
We review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the district court. Id. 
In addition, the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 56 
requires that the facts be recited by the appellate court in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. See Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82 at ^ [2: 
%1 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary 
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County, 2003 UT 28, f 4, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these 
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant 
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at transcript page 16 line 13-22, and page 472 
of the record, \l in the Rule 52 and 59 motion. 
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5.6 Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29 
U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever? 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial 
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter 
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze 
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's 
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1041, R. 1411-1414, and transcript page 
23. 
5.7 Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law. 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial 
10 
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter 
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze 
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's 
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness). 
This issue was preserved for appeal atR. 1411-1414. Even if not preserved, a 
determination by a Utah Court that state garnishment law may attach ERISA 
exempt retirement accounts will lead to the preemption of the entire law by a 
federal court. 
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(6)Citations to determinative law. 
§78-2(a)-3 (2)0) 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court. 
29U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), 
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the 
plan may not be assigned or alienated. 
29U.S.C. 1144(a) 
(a) Supersedure; effective date Except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III 
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described 
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) 
of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975. 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168 
"The issue of whether The issue of "whether res judicata bars an 
action presents a question of law[,] which we review for 
correctness." Massey v. Board of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty. 
Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27,15, 86 P.3d 120 (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted)." 
Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82 
12 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary 
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County, 2003 UT 28,14, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these 
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant 
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case. 
Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint 
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support 
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 
12 
Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question 
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253. 
Rule 12(b) and (c) 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if 
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper 
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with 
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or 
motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that 
claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) 
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are 
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may 
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this 
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the 
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of 
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as 
is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented 
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting 
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10 
f 6 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's reference to the 
motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, as well as its 
failures to exclude matters outside the pleadings and to properly 
convert the motion into one for summary judgment, warrant 
reversal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(c). "If a court does not 
exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a 
rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is 
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without 
considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,1J12, 104 P.3d 1226. The propriety 
of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law we review 
for correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
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910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are 
appropriate only where the court concludes that the plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, after 
accepting all the factual allegations made in the complaint as 
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. See id. 
\1 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for 
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court 
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, 
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to 
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer 
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the 
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A 
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone 
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating 
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been 
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as 
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for 
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6). 1 
Tf8 Plaintiffs claim that, in dismissing the case, the trial 
court improperly considered material outside the pleadings. If a 
court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion 
into one for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This 
rule 12(b) conversion process includes giving the parties 
reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent summary 
judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.; 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996); 
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements 
are especially important with respect to the party against whom 
judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that 
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 
material is particularly important). Our rules provide that 
complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to crossclaims, 
as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the 
definition of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings 
"include[s] any written or oral evidence . . . which . . . 
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substantiates]... and does not merely reiterate what is said 
in the pleadings.1' Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at 1J12 (second, 
third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
UCA 78-23-13 
78-23-13. Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against 
creditor to prevent violation of chapter ~ Costs and attorney's fees. 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is 
entitled to injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or 
other person to prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court 
may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to 
injunctive relief or damages. 
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(7) Statement of the Case, 
1) Defendant and Appeallee issued a writ of garnishment against retirement 
accounts which are exempt from attachment under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), 
and execution against properly known to belong to Plaintiffs employer, 
and exempt and largely worthless property such as living room and kitchen 
furniture on December 1, 2007 for the purposes of harassment of Petitioner 
in case # 050922650. See Record at 1-7, complaint. 
2) In response to this violation of UCA 78-23-13 and abuse of process, 
Plaintiff filed the case this appeal is taken from in the West Jordan District, 
where Petitioner resides and the harm was done. No relief was granted by 
the court prior to the filing of this case. 
3) The complaint alleged harm due to encumbrance of his employers property, 
lost time, and attorneys fees allowed under UCA 78-23-13. 
4) Defendant's filed a motion under Rule 12(b) to dismiss and attached 
affidavits from attorneys, but no other fact witnesses, in support of their 
claim. No affidavits from actual fact witnesses who were not attorneys 
were attached. See Record at 9-13 8. 
5) Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, and concurrently a motion for 
summary disposition under Rule 56, as he understood that if they could ask 
the court to proceed under Rule 56 he could also. See Record at 290-311. 
This was supported by affidavits from multiple individuals covering all 
aspects of the claims. See Record at 169-290. 
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6) Defendants did not reply to the memorandum in opposition to dismissal, 
but did respond to the motion for summary disposition with a motion to 
strike evidence as well as a response. See Record pages 290-322. 
7) The court held a hearing on February 2nd 2007, at which it heard argument 
from both parties. Plaintiff argued that evidence was not available for the 
hearing, and that a delay under Rule 56 should be granted by the court. See 
minute entry at Record page 468-469. 
8) The court allowed an order from another case to be filed, without notice, at 
hearing in order to allegedly prove that another court had resolved the 
issues before it. Petitioner was not allowed time to respond. See transcript 
at page 61 line 1-3. 
9) The court, only at the end of the hearing, announced that it would treat the 
Rule 12(b) motion as one under Rule 56. It did not allow additional time to 
gather evidence as requested. 
10)The court announced that the complaint had not been filed in good faith, 
and only for the purposes of harassment, thereby awarding attorneys fees of 
any amount sought by Defendants. See Transcript pages 61-66. 
1 l)An order was prepared by defendants, while a rule 52 and 59 motion was 
prepared by Plaintiff. Plaintiff objected to the order. 
12) After disregarding a rule 52 and 59 motion summarily, the court entered a 
the findings of fact and order without change. See Record at 582-595 
Plaintiff appealed for the first time. See Record at 515-516. 
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13)The court then entered a "Judgment on pleading" after appeal. See Record 
at 607-608. 
14)Plaintiff appealed again. See Record at 598-600. Plaintiff also amended 
his earlier appeal. See Record at 596-597. 
15)The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases. See Record at 612-613. 
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(8) Summary of arguments: 
8.1 Summary of Argument that the court failed to give notice of it's conversion of 
the motion from Rule 12(b) to rule 56: 
The first mention of the fact that the court would consider items outside the 
pleadings was made on transcript page 61, when it accepted the docket of the case 
before Judge "Kuntz" (actually Tommey, the transcript has an error) into the 
record. The ruling was clearly considering items outside of the pleadings, 
however no explicit order converting the Rule 12(b) motion was entered prior to 
the order found at Record index 586, in the preamble. An announcement after the 
fact is clearly not timely, and should be enough to warrant reversal unless the 
court can dismiss on some other grounds such as failure to state a claim. As 
argued in other section, the claim was stated properly or near properly, and 
Plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his claim if it was defective in form 
including by minor interlineations if the words "intentional" needed to be added. 
8.2 Summary of argument that the court entered a Judgment on the pleadings 
when the pleadings when the pleadings were not closed and no answer was filed. 
There is not a dispute that Defendants did not file an answer, and thus did not raise 
any affirmative defenses. Despite this, the Court entered "05-29-07 Filed 
judgment: Judgment on Pleading" again without notice that the motion was being 
converted from rule 12(b) to rule 12(c). This clear error warrants disregarding 
any assertions by the court that the Defendants has "pled" anything, they did not 
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have a pleading before the court. For those reasons parts of the order of the court 
which require a pleading to have been entered should be stricken. 
8.3 Summary of the argument that the Court allowed an affirmative defense of 
"proper purpose" and res-judicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process 
claim on Rule 12(b)(6): 
The Court accepted a new piece of evidence at hearing, a court order which was 
not made part of the official record, which purported to prove that the issues in this 
case were decided before another court. Petitioner objected that he was denied 
due process in preparing a response to the defense raised for the first time at 
hearing by Plaintiff, however the Court relied on the fact that relief should have 
been sought in another court as one of the primary findings of lack of merit in the 
present complain. Also, Defendants were allowed to argue an affirmative defense, 
that is issuing process for a proper, rather than improper purpose, although with 
mal intent, without raising the affirmative defense for the first time in a responsive 
pleading. Based upon this improper action the Judgment should be reversed. 
8.4 Summary that dismissal should have been without prejudice to amendment 
based upon the pleadings. 
As the court ruled without pleadings being closed and answer, upon defect in the 
claim, it lacked the ability to reach a conclusion on the merits of the case, thus the 
dismissal should be without prejudice. 
Furthermore additional evidence, that the attorneys who issued the garnishment 
knew that they were going after exempt property prior to issuing the writs, was 
discovered between filing of the complaint and the hearing. For this reason 
amendment of the claim should have been allowed. 
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8.5 Summary of argument on the award of attorney's fees appropriate given the 
court must make factual inferences in favor of Plaintiff. 
The standard of law is clear. In a motion to dismiss, the court must make all 
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Yet the Court took the proffer 
of an opposing attorney as to the mental state of Plaintiff (anger) and ignored the 
factual statements by Plaintiff that he was only trying to protect his exempt 
retirement accounts, property of third parties, and his own exempt property which 
was worthless to Defendants and sought only for the purposes of harassment, such 
as living room and kitchen furniture. 
8.6 Summary of Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement 
assets under 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever? 
The cited federal law always wins against state law. If it is a "proper purpose" to 
garnish a retirement account in Utah, then the answer is yes. While the court does 
not need to address this issue, a lower court has. Absent overruling the lower 
court, the law in Utah is clear. 
8.7 Summary of Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law. 
Only if Utah does not allow debtors who have their retirement funds garnished to 
defend themselves in court and seek damages for doing so, by ruling that an 
attorney who knowingly sought to garnish them for malicious reasons was acting 
for a "proper purpose in Utah" Federal courts have jurisdiction to overrule the 
decision of any Utah court including this one. Pretend I am bringing the issue for 
the first time here. The exemption code could be interpreted by the court to 
prohibit the preemption of Utah law, however it is the duty of the court of appeals 
and not me to construe the law in such a way that federal courts don't invalidate it. 
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(9) Argument. 
9.1 Did the court improperly convert a motion under Rule 12(b) to a Rule 56 
motion without notice and an ability to gather evidence by all sides? 
The record on this issue is clear. Nowhere prior to hearing or in any notice of 
hearing did the court indicate that it was going to covert the motion from one 
under Rule 12(b) to rule 56. At hearing the court considered material outside the 
pleadings, and even allowed the Defendants to enter new material outside the 
pleading which was only disclosed that day. See Transcript at page 61 lines 1-3. 
If a court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion into one for summary 
judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule 12(b) conversion process includes 
giving the parties reasonable notice and opportunity to submit all pertinent 
summary judgment materials for the court's consideration. See id.; Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated 
Students of Univ. of Utah , 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). The notice and 
opportunity to submit requirements are especially important with respect to the 
party against whom judgment is entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that 
the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is particularly 
important). Our rules provide that complaints and answers constitute pleadings. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to 
crossclaims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the definition of 
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pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings ffinclude[s] any written or oral evidence 
. . . which . . .substantiates] . . . and does not merely reiterate what is said in the 
pleadings." Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at 1J12 (second, third, and fourth 
alterations in original) (quotations and citation omitted). 
When petitioner asked the court for additional time to gather evidence 
under Rule 31 from a witness who testified as to the malicious nature of the 
actions of defendants abuse of process, the Judge refused to allow the taking of 
evidence, see transcript p 16 lines 13 to page 17 line 15 and also page 18 line 17 
to page 19 line 8. A subpoena under Rule 31 had already been issued, see Record 
at 357-360. The Subpoena was issued on January 13th 2007, and the time to 
respond had not passed prior to dismissal. The Judge did not quash or address the 
subpoena. 
The Judge clearly considered material outside of the pleadings in the 
hearing, including proffers of evidence from counsel for Defendant. Petitioner 
objected to the proffer of this evidence. See transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 18-
24. By not taking Plaintiffs version of the facts at face value, and deciding on the 
merits against Plaintiffs version of events, the Court improperly granted summary 
disposition without notice to even allow refuting testimony, affidavits, and 
arguments of law. For this reason the error should be reversed and the case 
remanded. 
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9.2 Did the court enter a Judgment on the pleadings when the pleadings when the 
pleadings were not closed and now answer was filed? 
The standard of review for this issue is quoted in Tuttle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 
10, at Tf6(quoted in full above) and f 7: 
f 7 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should be reversed for 
treating Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(c). In its order granting the motion, the trial court 
referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, 
despite a reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to 
dismiss under 12(b)(6). Because Defendants never filed an answer 
to the complaint, the pleadings were not closed at the time the 
trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings. A 
motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone 
granted, prior to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating 
that 12(c) motions are to be made after the pleadings have been 
closed). We will therefore review the trial court's decision as 
if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for 
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6). 1 
This issue was not preserved, as the court raised this issue for the first time 
when it docketed it's Judgment as "05-29-07 Filed judgment: Judgment on 
Pleading" As there was no opportunity to respond to an answer, or even advanced 
notice that the judgment was "on the pleading" this issue should be reviewed at the 
appellate level. 
There is no dispute that an answer was not filed. See transcript page 45 
lines 16-18. Yet a Judgment on the pleadings was entered. Even if the court of 
Appeals can establish that the pleading of Petitioner should be dismissed under 
Rule 12(b), the judgment of dismissal with prejudice is no longer justified. The 
court specifically stated that the dismissal was with prejudice due to reviewing 
material outside of the pleadings in it's final order. See Record at page 590 f4. 
Even if the court of appeals finds that dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b) for 
failure to state a claim, the award of attorneys fees can not stand due to it's 
reliance upon material outside of the pleadings, and should be reversed. In 
addition, Plaintiff should be allowed to file a motion for leave to amend. 
9.3 Did the Court allow an affirmative defense of "proper purpose" and res-
judicata to be raised in defense of the abuse of process claim on Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion ? 
The standard of review is found in Tucker V. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. 2002 UT 54 further quoting Gill v. Timm, which notes that 
"affirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings and are usually 
waived if not so pleaded." (citations omitted). 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 
1986): 
7 Gill recites the general rule that affirmative defenses should be set 
forth in responsive pleadings. Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the 
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the 
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 
1990) (emphasis added),(2) this general rule recognizes that 
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the 
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at page 472 of the record, at f 6 in 
Petitioner's Rule 52 and 59 motion and at trial page 57 line 25 through page 58 
line 14. While the issue was only raised for the first time with citations to law in 
the rule 52 and 59 motion, plaintiff did object to both the lack of answer (See 
transcript page 45 lines 16-18.) and to allowing material outside the pleadings to 
be entered in support of res-judicata (See transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 18-24.) 
and also in support of the hearsay nature of the "proper purpose" claims of 
Defendants, advanced by way of an affidavit of Attorney Sivilstrini testifying to 
the actions and mental state of Attorney Lundgren. See Record at 296. 
In any event, the error is clear. Affirmative defenses of proper purpose and 
res-judicata were raised without an answer. The res-judicata defense was raised at 
the hearing, prior to announcement of conversion, without allowing response. 
Because of this error the court of appeals should reverse and remand for further 
proceedings including amendment of the form of the pleading if appropriate. 
9.4 Should dismiss have been without prejudice based upon the pleadings? 
The standard of review is quoted above in Turtle vs. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, at ^ [6. 
In a dismissal based upon Rule 12(b), which has not been converted on full and 
fair notice to a Rule 56 motion, the dismissal should be without prejudice to other 
claims, causes of action, or pleadings being raised by motion for leave to amend. 
This issue was preserved at trial at Transcript page 46 lines 6-11. It is well settled 
that in order to constitute res-judicata and a dismissal of a claim with prejudice, a 
judgment must have been based upon a full and fair hearing, with adequate notice 
and an opportunity to present evidence. To quote from Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 
UT App 168 at Tfl2, 'The issue of whether The issue of "whether res judicata bars 
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an action presents a question of law[,] which we review for correctness." Massey 
v. Board of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty. Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 
27,TJ5, 86 P.3d 120 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)." If 
the present dismissal was based upon a full and fair hearing and opportunity to 
present and rebut evidence, then the conclusion of the trial court was correct. 
However as it was not based upon proper notice, and the copy of the order was 
sprung upon the parties, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. 
9.5 Was an award of attorney's fees appropriate given the court must make factual 
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, not Defendant. 
The standard of review is found in To quote Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT APP 36, 
996 P.2d 1081 which states: 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint 
as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support 
of his or her claims. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990). Additionally, we "must consider all the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 744. "The propriety of a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a question 
of law that we review for correctness." Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1253. 
This issue was preserved on page 472 of the record, \1 in the Rule 52 and 
59 motion ruled upon by the Court and at trial in transcript. See for instance 
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transcript at page 41 line 5-6 and 18-24. The court ignored the proffers of Plaintiff 
proffer of evidence found at transcript page 24 line 8-25, and Page 51 lines 4 
through page 52 line 10. Nowhere does the court cite to any clear evidence why 
the current case is filed in bad faith, citing instead the proffers of evidence by Mr. 
Bums that an "inference" from irrelevant facts justified a finding of bad faith. See 
Transcript at page 7 line 22. The only motive for filing the suit was protection of 
exempt assets and property of others from harassment and abuse of process. Even 
if such protection was not available, the good faith effort to secure such protection 
should not be punished. 
The only sworn evidence before the court about Petitioner's mental state 
was found at Record pages 455-467, Plaintiffs "Affidavit in Opposition to Motion 
for Sanctions" filed on January 29 2007. The court ignored any testimony found 
in this document, and made no specific findings of fact as to why the testimony 
was not credible. While the court has considerable discretion to judge the 
credibility of witnesses and weight the facts in a motion to dismiss filed after 
pleadings are closed, and upon proper notice under Rule 56, it is patently unfair to 
impose the same latitude on a Rule 12(b) motion. 
Even the argument that the present suit was unnecessary is false. At the 
time the suit was filed, the suit WAS necessary. Only after filing the suit was the 
relief requested in the present suit granted. See Record at page 302-304, order of 
Judge Hanson attached as Exhibit A to the memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss, only signed by opposing counsel approving as to form on 
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December 22n 2006. There is no way that a hypothetical claim that the suit was 
unnecessary can stand, as only a time machine could prove if the partial settlement 
found at R. 302 paragraphs 1-4 would not have happened. Had not the threat of 
the other lawsuit been present, Defendants could have continued to press the 
claims that they released only after being served on December 6 2006. See 
Record at pages 139, 149, and 159, proof of service before withdrawal of claims 
found at R. 302. 
Finally, the award of attorneys fees was fraudulent. Defendants double 
billed for a motion to consolidate in another case which was denied. The issue 
was raised before the court, and the court awarded fees in another case. This issue 
alone should warrant reversal. See Record at 518-525. 
The court should reverse and remand the issue of attorney's fees as no bad 
faith was involved, and the purpose of protecting exempt property and property of 
others from harassing executions and garnishments is a proper purpose. 
9.6 Was Summary Judgment against Plaintiff under Rule 56 appropriate? 
The standard of review for the granting of the motion to dismiss in this 
case is given by Ellsworth v. Lowell 2006 UT 77 f 11-12: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Tfl 1 While Lowell moved to dismiss Mr. Ellsworth's complaint 
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2006). Because "affidavits or other evidence" 
were presented to, and not excluded by, the district court, we 
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review that court's decision as a summary judgment. DOIT, Inc. 
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 (Utah 1996). 
f 12 "[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents for 
review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases 
decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes." 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). 
We review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the district court. Id. 
In addition, the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 56 
requires that the facts be recited by the appellate court in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. See Johnson v. Hermes 2005 UT 82 at ^ [2: 
Tf2 When reviewing a rule 56(c) motion for summary 
judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County, 2003 UT 28, ^  4, 73 P.3d 362. Thus, in reviewing these 
facts, we present them in a light most favorable to Appellant 
Hermes, the commercial developer in this case. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at transcript page 16 line 13-22, and page 472 
of the record, *fl in the Rule 52 and 59 motion. In summary, the Court found 
against Plaintiff in what can only be described as a judgment that his affidavits 
lacked credibility and should be ignored. This is nowhere better illustrated than in 
the exchange over the pleading that Defendants were given sufficient information 
to know that the retirement accounts were exempt, in which the court argued with 
the proffers and affidavits of Plaintiff contradicting him with regard to damages. 
See transcript at pages 30 onward, the court constantly asked irrelevant question 
and sought to interrupt and discredit the testimony of Plaintiff. See page 31 line 
24 to page 32 line 5: 
24 THE COURT: But how did they know that, 
25 Sir, until they send the constable out to check 
I and find out what you have and at least inventory 
2 i t -
3 MR. BRYNER: The reported interviews-
4 THE COURT: And give you an opportunity 
5 to claim them as exempt? 
Plaintiff had just told the court how they knew that by reading from his 
affidavit backed with admissible exhibits. See Record at pages 214-267, 
specifically pages 215-216, [^8-14 and exhibits C,D, and E. The court simply 
didn't believe the testimony of Plaintiff, despite the fact that he must do so in a 
motion to dismiss unless the evidence is completely without foundation or 
inadmissible. 
Had an attorney who actually issued the writs testified by way of affidavit 
to good faith as an affirmative defense, it might have been admissible under Rule 
56 after the close of pleadings, however as argued in section 9.3 above. 
9.7 Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29 
U.S.C. 1144(a), for any purpose whatsoever? 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial 
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
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A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter 
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze 
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's 
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1041, R. 1411-1414, and transcript page 
23. However I don't even have to argue this. If any order establishing that it is 
proper to garnish ERISA exempt retirement accounts is made by this Court, the 
federal courts can invalidate the statute, even if I didn't brief the issue properly. 
Much as with constitutionality, the duty of the Court is to interpret the law of Utah 
in such a way as to avoid invalidation by federal court. 
9.8 Should the court void and preempt Utah Law under federal law. 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial 
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter 
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze 
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's 
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1411-1414. Even if not preserved, a 
determination by a Utah Court that state garnishment law may attach ERISA 
exempt retirement accounts will lead to the preemption of the entire law by a 
federal court. Much as with constitutionality, the duty of the Court is to interpret 
the law of Utah in such a way as to avoid invalidation by federal court. I am just 
repeating the argument in the summary, without proper briefing, as the rules of 
appellate procedure are not relevant to the issue of law raised clearly under the 
federal statute. Courts occasionally have a compelling duty to law over procedural 
technicalities, and fact over form. This is one of them. Do the right thing. 
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(10) Relief Sought 
10.1 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals review the ruling of the trial court 
for legal correctness, and determine if his ruling is the law in the state of Utah. 
10.2 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals remand to correct the error of 
admitting a ruling from another case, at the time of a rule 12(b) hearing, without 
notice of conversion to the parties, as well as the 
10.3 Petitioner asks that the cour 
10.4 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals declare that Utah's garnishment law 
is void and preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), and to remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
38 
(11) Section 11, record sections index 
A) Complaint, Record pages 1-9. 
B) Affidavit in Support of Complaint (less exhibits) record pages 214-226. 
C) Minute entry, findings of fact, and Order, record pages 582-595 
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Fax: 877-519-3413 Phone: 255-7729 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




i Case No. Obo¥l7Sf1 
) Judge Ad/HcUs 
Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows: 
General Allegations 
1) Plaintiff is an individual, resides at 1037 watercress lane #2X, City of Midvale, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
2) Defendant #1 is Emily Smoak, Residing at 186 M St, Salt Lake City UT 84103 
and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT. 
3) Defendant #2 is Howard Lundgren, Residing at 1357 Yale Ave, Salt Lake City 
UT 84105 and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT. 
4) Defendant #3 is Cohne Rappaport and Segal, a professional corporation with 
offices at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT and a registered agent of Jeffrey L Silvestrini 
at the same address. 
OOOOOl 
5) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees in Case # 
050922650. As a result of a 1 hour hearing and the two documents being filed, the case 
was dismissed by Judge Hanson. 
6) Defendants obtained a Judgment for attorney's fees in case # 050922650 on 
October 26th 2006 for $17,292.00. This is not a case involving any child support and 
only Defendants and Plaintiff are participants in the lawsuit. 
7) Plaintiff offered to post a bond for the full amount of the Judgment including 3 
years interest from a loan obtained from his retirement funds in a motion to stay and set 
bond pending appeal filed on November 3rd 2006. 
8) Due to disclosures filed in case #044904183 which is a divorce action, 
Defendants knew that Plaintiffs accounts at Fidelity Investments accounts below were 
exempt retirement accounts. 
a. ROLLOVER IRA, Fidelity Brokerage #129345466. 
b. PROFIT SHARING KEOGH, Fidelity Brokerage #129404276 
c. TRADITIONAL IRA, Fidelity Brokerage: #129409308 
9) On December 1st 2006 Defendants obtained a garnishment against the exempt 
retirement accounts in 8) at Fidelity Investments. 
10) The action in 9) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful 
1 l)The action in 9) was taken to harass. 
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12)The action in 9) was taken with malice. 
13)The action in 9) was taken to abuse process. 
14)On December 1st 2006 Defendants filed "Application for Writ of Execution" in 
the same case. The application filed with the Court listed only "Safe and contents 
therein, including gold coins" however the writ of execution added the following text: 
"2. Any and all other non-exempt personal property including but not limited to: 
televisions, VCR9 s, couches, tables, chairs, dining room sets, jewelry, art work, cameras, 
video recorders, watches, clocks, guns, skis, golf clubs, sporting goods, computers 
(including all hardware & software), printers, and any and all other ...." 
15)Defendants knew that couches, tables, chairs and dining room sets less than 
$500 in value were exempt from execution. 
16)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff has 
nothing but old furniture with negligible value which is exempt from execution. 
17)Defendants included exempt living room and kitchen property in the writ of 
execution. 
18) The action in 17) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful 
19)The action in 17) was taken to harass. 
20)The action in 17) was taken with malice. 
21)The action in 17) was taken to abuse process. 
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22)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was 
a computer professional who works from his home. 
23)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was 
in possession of a large number of computers and software owned by his company, 
Xilinx Inc (Stock symbol XLNX). 
24)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff also 
was in possession of exempt tools of the trade relating to the electronic engineering 
profession. 
25)Those tools owned by Plaintiff are subject to a $3500 exemption. 
26)Defendants included property of Xilinx Corporation in the writ of execution. 
27) The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful 
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass. 
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice. 
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process. 
3 l)Defendants included exempt property of Plaintiff in the writ of execution. 
32)The action in 31) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful 
33)The action in 31) was taken to harass. 
34)The action in 31) was taken with malice. 
35)The action in 31) was taken to abuse process. 
OOOOCK 
36)The keepers receipt issued by Constable SD Warnick went even further than 
this description, specifying all property seen without any exceptions for clothing, medical 
equipment, provisions, or any of the other property allowed by law. 
First Cause of Action. UCA 78-23-13 Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against 
creditor to prevent violation of chapter - Costs and attorney's fees. 
3 7) Accusations in 9)-36) are repeated as if contained in this section. 
38)UCA 78-23-13 reads: 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to 
injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to 
prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to injunctive relief or damages. 
3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering 
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation 
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of 
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with 
Xilinx. 
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in 
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the 
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx. 
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41) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that 
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going 
through a custody evaluation at this time. 
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in 
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The 
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who 
share Joint custody of the children. 
43)Plaintiff asks that this Court enter a temporary injunction restraining 
Defendants from removing any exempt property, or from seeking a writ of execution in 
another case against the same exempt property. 
Second Cause of Action, Abuse of Process. 
44) Actions in 9)-36) are repeated as if included in this section. 
45)Defendants have a duty to not include exempt property in any writ of 
execution. 
46)Defendants by taking actions in 9)-36) above have breached their duty. 
47)The actions taken in 9)-36) are the malicious and deliberate misuse or 
perversion of regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying legal action. 
48)Plaintiff has been harmed by such action, including but not limited to harm 
from disclosure of the writs to my employer (Xilinx), the legal actions which Plaintiff has 
OOOOOb 
been forced to take in this and other actions to defend against the unlawful process, and 
attorney's fees in this action. 
Wherefore Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court: 
1) Immediately enter a temporary restraining order preventing the removal of any 
exempt property listed in "affidavit of exempt property and value" 
2) Declare any order knowingly specifying exempt property void. 
3) That the Defendants reimburse Xilinx Corporation and Plaintiff for any and all 
fees and damages for any result of Defendant's actions. 
4) That Defendants pay all costs including court costs and service costs associated 
with bringing this complaint, and Petitioner be allowed to retain an attorney for any 
further action. 
Dated this / day of December, 2006 ^ 7 , 
y&oger Brynen^ 
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Roger Bryner ^'^'ORIGINAL 
Petitioner Pro Se 
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Fax: 877-519-3413 Phone: 255-7729 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 








Plaintiff having been sworn an 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) COMPLAINT 
) Case No. 060417519 
) Judge Adkins 
oath to tell the truth, and to not testify based upon my 
belief but only upon those fact which I have personal knowledge of testified to the 
following facts which are numbered to correspond to the accusations set forth in the 
complaint served upon defendants. Petitioner testifies: 
General Allegations 
1) Plaintiff is your affiant and resides at 1037 watercress lane #2X, City of 
Midvale, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
2) Defendant #1 is Emily Smoak, Residing at 186 M St, Salt Lake City UT 84103 
and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT. 
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3) Defendant #2 is Howard Lundgren, possibly Residing at 1357 Yale Ave, Salt 
Lake City UT 84105 and doing business at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT. 
4) Defendant #3 is Cohne Rappaport and Segal, a professional corporation with 
offices at 257 E 200 S, Suite 700, SLC, UT and a registered agent of Jeffrey L Silvestrini 
at the same address. 
5) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for attorney's fees in Case # 
050922650. As a result of a 1 hour hearing and the two documents being filed, the case 
was dismissed by Judge Hanson. 
6) Defendants obtained a Judgment for attorney's fees in case # 050922650 on 
October 26th 2006 for $17,292.00. This is not a case involving any child support and 
only Defendants and Plaintiff are participants in the lawsuit. 
7) Plaintiff offered to post a bond for the full amount of the Judgment including 3 
years interest from a loan obtained from his retirement funds in a motion to stay and set 
bond pending appeal filed on November 3rd 2006. The Court approved a cash bond or a 
corporate surety. See Exhibit A, order on Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Judgment. 
8) Due to disclosures filed in case #044904183 which is a divorce action, 
Defendants knew that Plaintiffs accounts at Fidelity Investments accounts below were 
exempt retirement accounts. Defendants knew the specific account numbers of the 
accounts at fidelity . See Exhibit B, application for writ of garnishment. Defendants only 
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knew the accounts numbers because they were disclosed as retirement accounts in 
"Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For 
Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents" pages 36-39, attached as 
Exhibit C. These two facts, that the account numbers were specified by Defendants and 
that the only data Defendants had which did so also specified them as retirement 
accounts, clearly shows that the action could only be taken with the knowledge that it was 
not allowed. 
a. ROLLOVER IRA, Fidelity Brokerage #129345466. 
b. PROFIT SHARING KEOGH, Fidelity Brokerage #129404276 
c. TRADITIONAL IRA, Fidelity Brokerage: #129409308 
9) On December 1st 2006 Defendants obtained a garnishment against the exempt 
retirement accounts in 8) at Fidelity Investments. See Exhibit D, writ of garnishment. 
10)The action in 9) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is 
common knowledge even among non-lawyers that retirement accounts are exempt from 
execution. 
1 l)The action in 9) was taken to harass. Emily Smoak and Howard Lundgren 
have lied about me again and again in Court. They have brought the same claims as 
many as 9 times in a row in multiple cases, and have had filing restrictions imposed 
against them in cases # 060903365 and #044904183. See Exhibit E, order stating "Court 
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has been overwhelmed in this case—and in the companion paternity/divorce case, Docket 
No. 044904183—by the sheer volume of pleadings, many of which, as the Court has 
already found, are frivolous. Accordingly, the Court agrees that the time has come to put 
some limitations on the filings. The Court enjoins each side from filing more than one 
motion at a time." The evidence of the prior orders of the Court in two cases imposing 
filing restrictions upon an attorney is clear evidence of their bad faith. While a non-
attorney such as myself might simply be ignorant of the law, there is no such defense for 
CRS to have filing restrictions imposed against them. They should have been disbarred. 
12)The action in 9) was taken with malice. David W. Brown has talked to them 
and has told me that they have extreme malice and fear for me. 
13)The action in 9) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed 
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29, 
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt 
property. 
14)On December 1st 2006 Defendants filed "Application for Writ of Execution" in 
the same case. The application filed with the Court listed only "Safe and contents 
therein, including gold coins" however the writ of execution added the following text: 
"2. Any and all other non-exempt personal property including but not limited to: 
televisions, VCR' s, couches, tables, chairs, dining room sets, jewelry, art work, cameras, 
nnns>i ? 
video recorders, watches, clocks, guns, skis, golf clubs, sporting goods, computers 
(including all hardware & software), printers, and any and all other ...." 
15)Defendants knew that couches, tables, chairs and dining room sets less than 
$500 in value were exempt from execution. This is common knowledge for attorney's. 
16)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff has 
nothing but old furniture with negligible value which is exempt from execution. See 
Exhibit F, financial disclosure of Petitioner in case #044904183 served upon Defendants 
on November 24th 2006. Also, there was an earlier dispute about the division of minor 
property in case #044904183 which established the minor value of the property involved. 
See "Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For 
Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents" 
17)Defendants included exempt living room and kitchen property in the writ of 
execution. See Exhibit G, writ of execution including keepers receipt. 
18)The action in 17) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is 
common knowledge that $500 exemptions for living room furniture and kitchen furniture 
exist. 
19)The action in 17) was taken to harass. See ^ [11 above. 
20)The action in 17) was taken with malice. See ^ 12 above. 
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21)The action in 17) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed 
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29, 
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt 
property. 
22)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was 
a computer professional who works from his home. See "Affidavit Of Greg Brown 
Served Upon Defendants In Case #044904183 In Aug 2004" filed concurrently with this 
motion. This was also included in "Petitioners Response To Respondents First Set Of 
Interrogatories, Requests For Admissions, And Requests For Production Of Documents" 
and many pleadings in case #044904183. 
23)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff was 
in possession of a large number of computers and software owned by his company, 
Xilinx Inc (Stock symbol XLNX). See ^ [22 above. 
24)Defendants knew, due to the disclosures in case #044904183, that Plaintiff also 
was in possession of exempt tools of the trade relating to the electronic engineering 
profession. See Tf22 above. 
25)Those tools owned by Plaintiff are subject to a $3500 exemption. 
26)Defendants included property of Xilinx Corporation in the writ of execution. 
This was done in secret, and hidden from the Judge. In addition, no statement attesting to 
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the fact that they did not believe that anyone else owned the equipment was included as 
CRS normally does. See Exhibit H, application for writ of execution in case # 
004902839 not involving Plaintiff in which Howard Lundgren's document stated the 
standard language "2. That the personal property sought to be garnished, upon 
information and belief, is non-exempt. 3. That upon information and belief, such real 
property sought to be garnished does not consist in whole or part of earnings from 
personal services as defined in Rule 64D(d)(vi) U.R.C.P." in order to get the writ. This is 
noticeably missing from both the application for writ of garnishment and also the 
application for writ of execution. See Exhibits D and G and "Affidavit Of Jeffrey L. 
Silvestrini In Support Of Writ Of Execution In Case # 050922650" filed concurrently 
with this affidavit. 
27)The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is 
common knowledge that you can not seize the property of another. 
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass. See f l 1 above. 
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice. See |12 above. 
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed 
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29, 
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt 
property. 
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3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering 
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation 
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of 
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with 
Xilinx. See "AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN 
CASE # 050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit. 
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in 
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the 
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx. See 
"AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN CASE # 
050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit. 
41)Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that 
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going 
through a custody evaluation at this time. The attempt to take everything in the living 
room and kitchen, just prior to the children arriving, can only be harassment. 
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in 
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The 
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who 
share Joint custody of the children. 
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the fact that they did not believe that anyone else owned the equipment was included as 
CRS normally does. See Exhibit H, application for writ of execution in case # 
004902839 not involving Plaintiff in which Howard Lundgren's document stated the 
standard language "2. That the personal property sought to be garnished, upon 
information and belief, is non-exempt. 3. That upon information and belief, such real 
property sought to be garnished does not consist in whole or part of earnings from 
personal services as defined in Rule 64D(d)(vi) U.R.C.P." in order to get the writ. This is 
noticeably missing from both the application for writ of garnishment and also the 
application for writ of execution. See Exhibits D and G and "Affidavit Of Jeffrey L. 
Silvestrini In Support Of Writ Of Execution In Case # 050922650" filed concurrently 
with this affidavit. 
27)The action in 26) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is 
common knowledge that you can not seize the property of another. 
28)The action in 26) was taken to harass. See 1J11 above. 
29)The action in 26) was taken with malice. See TJ12 above. 
30)The action in 26) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed 
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29, 
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt 
property. 
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31 )Defendants included exempt property of Plaintiff in the writ of execution. 
32)The action in 31) was taken with the knowledge that it was unlawful. It is 
common knowledge that a $3500 exemption for trade tools exists. 
33)The action in 31) was taken to harass. See [^11 above. 
34)The action in 31) was taken with malice. See % 12 above. 
35)The action in 31) was taken to abuse process. See Exhibit I, "12-29-06 Filed 
order: Order on execution of plaintiffs property, Judge thanson, Signed December 29, 
2006" which establishes that the writ of execution was not valid and specified exempt 
property. 
36)The keepers receipt issued by Constable SD Warnick went even further than 
this description, specifying all property seen without any exceptions for clothing, medical 
equipment, provisions, or any of the other property allowed by law. See Exhibit G, 
keepers receipt. 
First Cause of Action, UCA 78-23-13 Injunctive relief damages, or both allowed against 
creditor to prevent violation of chapter -- Costs and attorney's fees. 
37) Accusations in 9)-36) are repeated as if contained in this section. 
38)UCA 78-23-13 reads: 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to 
injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to 
prevent or redress a violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to injunctive relief or damages. 
3 9) Allowing Defendants to seize the trade tools and electrical engineering 
equipment of Plaintiff which is worth less than $3500 owned by Xilinx Corporation 
would result in irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of 
work time and the ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with 
Xilinx. See "AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN 
CASE # 050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit. 
40) Allowing Defendants to seize the exempt trade tools of Plaintiff would result in 
irreparable harm including the loss of access to data by Xilinx, loss of work time and the 
ability to work by Plaintiff, and harm to Plaintiffs relationship with Xilinx. See 
"AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BROWN IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA IN CASE # 
050922650" filed concurrently with this affidavit. 
41)AUowing Defendants to seize the exempt furniture or clothing including that 
belonging to the Children would result in irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going 
through a custody evaluation at this time. The attempt to take everything in the living 
room and kitchen, just prior to the children arriving, can only be harassment. 
42) Allowing Defendants to seize the property of the Children would result in 
irreparable harm to Plaintiff who is going through a custody evaluation at this time. The 
property of the Children is the Joint Property of Svetlana Bryner and Roger Bryner, who 
share Joint custody of the children. 
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43)Plaintiff asks that this Court enter a temporary injunction restraining 
Defendants from removing any exempt property, or from seeking a writ of execution in 
another case against the same exempt property. This is done in good faith as CRS also 
opposes me in the civil case 044904183, the protective order in case 064905584, and the 
stalking injunction in case 060903365. There is no reason to go through the same 
exercise in all these cases. 
Second Cause of Action, Abuse of Process. 
44) Actions in 9)-36) are repeated as if included in this section. 
45)Defendants have a duty to not include exempt property in any writ of 
execution. I believe that the basis of abuse of process is the duty to use court process 
only for that purpose which it was intended, that is to take non-exempt property. Clearly 
CRS also believes they have a duty and has in prior cases in good faith affirmed that duty 
by exhibit H where they did in the past. 
46)Defendants by taking actions in 9)-36) above have breached their duty. 
47)The actions taken in 9)-36) are the malicious and deliberate misuse or 
perversion of regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying legal action. 
Clearly if they knew the property was exempt, they knew that it would be a perversion to 
seek it anyway. 
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48)Plaintiff has been harmed by such action, including but not limited to harm 
from disclosure of the writs to my employer (Xilinx), the legal actions which Plaintiff has 
been forced to take in this and other actions to defend against the unlawful process, and 
attorney's fees in this action. While I have not received a bill from David W. Brown, I 
retained him to represent me in the hearing before Judge Hanson. These fees were only 
as a result of the actions of CRS's refusal to stipulate to the relief that was only granted at 
the hearing, after 1 hour of wasted time. CRS did not prevail on ANY of it's claims, and 
each and every item sought to be exempted was declared exempt. Furthermore I 
expended no less than 4 hours myself, and 12 or more emails with the Xilinx legal 
department in this effort. Also, Xilinx had to hire a local attorney, Richard Flint, to 
represent them in this case. Also my car could not be removed from December 1st 2006 
to December 28 2006, resulting in the necessity of renting a car from Avis for 4 weeks 
at $160/week. Finally, more attorney's fees will be required in this case to defend against 
their illegal and abusive action, and their frivolous defenses. There are damages. 
Subscribed and Sworn this 2nd day of January, 2007 
Court Clerk 
000224 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 2nd day of January, 2007,1 did cause to be delivered by hand the forgoing 
document to the following persons: 
Attorney's for Defendants 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
257 E 200 S, Suite 700 
SLC, UT 84147-0008 
By Fax 801-364-3002 
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Exhibit C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
ROGER BRYNER, 
vs. : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
EMILY SMOAK,& COHNE 
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., . :Case No. 060417519 
The first matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Objection 
to Draft Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated February 
28, 2007. Plaintiff raises numerous objections to the content of 
the Findings and Conclusions and an objection that the Findings and 
Conclusions were never served and "therefore this is not before the 
Court." 
The proposed Findings and Conclusions and the proposed Order 
that were filed with the Court on February 23, 2007, each contain 
a Certificate of Service certifying that both documents were mailed 
to Plaintiff on February 15, 2007. On February 23, 2007, Plaintiff 
filed Verified Motion to Allow Normal Time to File Objection to 
Draft Order and Findings and Avoid a Rust To Judgment. Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion stated that he had received the Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law "with a mailing certificate dated February 
15, 2007." Plaintiff's copy of the mailing certificate was not 
signed. However, Plaintiff attached to the Verified Motion a letter 
dated February 15, 2007, addressed to him from the attorney for 
defendants, Thomas J. Burns, as well as the envelope postmarked 
02/15/07 in which the documents were mailed. It is clear to the 
Court that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order were mailed to the Plaintiff and are properly before the 
Court. 
The Court has considered each of Plaintiff's objections to the 
specific paragraphs of the Findings and Conclusions and Order and 
finds that each is without merit and each objection is denied. The 
Court has signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order contemporaneously with signing this Memorandum Decision. 
The next matter is the request for an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. Following the hearing of 
February 2, 2007, the Court determined that this case was without 
merit and was not brought in good faith. The Court gave defendants 
ten days to submit an Affidavit seeking an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Section 78-27-56, and Defendants have done so. 
Plaintiff has filed a Verified Objection to Affidavit of Thomas J. 
Burns and an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. [The Court on February 16, 
2007, denied Plaintiff's request to waive court fees, because the 
Court did not and does not find that the Plaintiff is impecunious.] 
Plaintiff's Verified Objection makes the claim that "as 
Defendants only prevailed on the merits of their motion to dismiss, 
it is not just or proper to give them attorney's fees for anything 
other than their motion to dismiss." Plaintiff claims that 
Defendant's did not prevail on their opposition to the Verified 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, or on their Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit of David W. Brown or on Defendants' Motion to 
Consolidate. Defendants had to respond to the Verified Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff did not obtain a TRO, and 
this action was dismissed in total. Defendants had to respond to 
the Affidavit of David W. Brown. While the Court did not 
specifically rule on the Motion To Strike The Affidavit, the Court 
dismissed the action in total. Defendants filed the Motion To 
Consolidate which was heard by Judge Toomey after the Court granted 
the Motion To Dismiss in this case. Judge Toomey did not grant the 
Motion to Consolidate, because this action was by then ordered 
dismissed. Defendants were forced to respond to the Motion for TRO 
and the Affidavit of David W. Brown because Plaintiff brought this 
action, which the Court has found to be meritless. Further, 
Defendants properly moved to consolidate both actions, before this 
Court ruled on the Motion To Dismiss. Defendants prevailed 
completely in this action by getting this case dismissed. 
Plaintiff questions the amount of time claimed by Defendants' 
attorneys. The Court notes that although this case was filed on 
December 7, 2 006, the Court's file is now two full files. The Court 
has read every pleading in this case. The Court does not doubt that 
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Defendants' attorneys have expended the time claimed in the 
Affidavit of Thomas J. Burns. The Court finds that the time 
expended by Defendants' attorneys was reasonable and necessary to 
defend against Plaintiff's action. The Court finds that the hourly 
rate charged by the attorneys and the paralegal are reasonable. 
Defendants are awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of $12,563.75. 
Defendants' attorney is to prepare the Judgment for attorneys' 
fees in accordance herewith. 
O£05S5 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI #2959 
THOMAS J. BURNS (BAR # 8918) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




EMILY SMOAK, A. HOWARD 
LUNDGREN, and COHNE, RAPPAPORT 
& SEGAL, P.C, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 060417519 
Judge Robert Adkins 
This matter came before this court regularly for a decision on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and for an Award of Attorney Fees pursuant to Utah's Bad Faith 
statue, Utah Code section 78-27-56 (2004). Defendants submitted their Motion to Dismiss, 
accompanied by supporting affidavits and other material, and Plaintiff responded by also filing 
affidavits and other material. The matter came on for hearing on February 2,207. Plaintiff 
represented himself at the hearing and Defendants were represented by Jeffrey L, Silvestrini and 
Thomas J. Burns. Because materials outside the pleadings were submitted by both parties, the 
Court deems it appropriate to treat Defendants' motion as one for Summary Judgment pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 of the Utah R. Civ. P. Having considered the papers of the parties 
and having heard argument and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In December 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against certain of the Defendants, which 
resulted in a judgment being entered against Plaintiff for bad faith filing pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78-27-26 (2004) in late 2006. 
2. Plaintiff did not satisfy the judgment entered against him in case number 050922650. 
3. In an effort to obtain at least partial satisfaction of the judgment in case number 
050922650, Defendants obtained a Writ of Execution and two Writs of Garnishment in 
that action. 
4. Plaintiffs complaint, filed in this case, focused on these writs. 
5. Attached to Defendants Writ of Execution were a notice of exemption and a request for 
hearing. 
6. Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to request, and did request, a hearing on the 
writ from the trial court in case number 050922650, and the trial court entertained his 
claims that certain property was exempt from execution. 
7. The judgment issued in case number 050922650 was never stayed or otherwise 
suspended; thus, Defendants were entitled to seek satisfaction of their judgment through 
the use of Writs of Execution and Garnishment. 
8. As permitted by rule, Plaintiff challenged Defendants right to execute on certain property 
in case number 050922650, and after Defendants declared that they had no interest in the 
majority of Plaintiff s property, the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs objection and clearly 
identified the non-exempt property upon which Defendants could execute. 
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9. Following the hearing, Defendants executed only on the identified non-exempt property. 
10. The filing of this current action was unnecessary to protect Plaintiffs interests and 
property; all protections available to Plaintiff could have been, and were, afforded to him 
in case number 050922650. In that case, Judge Hanson specifically identified the non-
exempt property on which Defendants could execute, and he specifically limited the 
scope of Defendants' execution. 
11. The trial court in case number 050922650 was positioned to provide Plaintiff with any 
additional protections, up to and including injunctive relief; however, it granted Plaintiff 
no such relief. 
12. On the day before he filed the complaint in this case, Plaintiff transmitted an electronic 
mailing to the Defendants, notifying them that he intended to file this separate lawsuit and 
indicating that he was doing so, at least in part, to avoid contact with Judge Hanson, 
whose decisions had dissatisfied him in the past. Plaintiffs message concerning Judge 
Hanson was derogatory in nature. 
13. To support an abuse of process claim, Plaintiff must present some evidence that 
Defendants obtained their Writs for some purpose other than that for which the writs are 
intended. It is clear to this court that Defendants obtained their Writs for the proper 
purpose of satisfying their existing, unsatisfied judgment against Plaintiff. 
14. Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for abuse of process in that Plaintiff has failed 
to plead any improper damages resulting from Defendants resort to Writs of Execution 
and Writs of Garnishment. Further, Plaintiff was provided due process on this issue in 
case number 050922650, where the court provided Plaintiff with a hearing and an 
3 
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opportunity to request any and all relief It is clear from the record that Defendants never 
took actual possession of, and never attempted to sell, any of Plaintiff s exempt property, 
either before or after Plaintiff identified property as exempt. 
15. Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is equally without merit. Access to injunctive relief 
requires Plaintiff to show that he has no other speedy remedy available to him to seek the 
relief he seeks through the injunction. Plaintiff was provided with, and availed himself 
of, another speedy remedy concerning Defendants' Writs, i.e., Plaintiff was provided with 
a hearing by the trial court in case number 050922650 and permitted to seek redress at 
that hearing. 
16. The court understands that the nature of the this case is the result of emotion and that 
Plaintiff is angry with the Defendants, at least in part due to Defendant Smoak's ongoing 
representation of Plaintiff s former domestic partner. 
17. Plaintiffs complaint lacks merit as a whole, and Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient 
facts to support any of the claims that may be included in his complaint. 
18. Further, the court finds that Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith, in part to harass and 
delay Defendants, and in part to avoid any further involvement with Judge Hanson. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs complaint is meritless, in that the trial court in case number 050922650 could, 
and did, provide him with all of the relief available to him under the circumstances, and 
this court cannot provide him with any additional relief. 
2. Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith in that he filed the complaint to harass 
Defendants, to force Defendants to expend unnecessary time and resources in connection 
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with their efforts to collect their judgment, and to delay Defendants efforts to collect on 
their lawfully issued judgment. 
3. This court elects to grant Defendants' requests for an award of fees pursuant to Utah code 
section 78-26-57, and directs Defendants to submit an Affidavit of the Accrued fees 
within ten days of this hearing. Plaintiff will be provided ten days to respond to the 
affidavit, and Defendant will then be given an opportunity to reply. This court will delay 
ruling on the amount to be awarded, if any, until this matter is submitted for decision 
through the normal course of events. 
4. Given that this court has reviewed matters beyond the pleading, this court elects to treat 
Defendants' Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and this court grants said 
Motion, which results in Plaintiffs complaint being dismissed, with prejudice. 
DATED this ~7 day of /flaxck , 2007. 
BY 
Approved as to form and content: 
Roger Bryner 
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JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI #2959 
THOMAS J. BURNS (BAR # 8918) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




EMILY SMOAK, A. HOWARD 
LUNDGREN, and COHNE, RAPPAPORT 
& SEGAL, P.C, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 060417519 
Judge Robert Adkins 
Based upon the findings and conclusions announced by this court, and issued 
contemporaneously with this order, this court enters the following Order: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, but because this court has considered materials 
beyond the pleadings, this court treats the Motion as one of Summary Judgment, resulting 
in the dismissal of Plaintiff s complaint with prejudice; 
2. Plaintiffs complaint was without merit and brought in bad faith; 
3. Defendants' request for an award of attorney fees based on Plaintiffs bad faith filing is 
granted. Defendants shall submit their affidavit of costs and fees, if any, within ten days 
of this court's oral decision, entered February 2,2007. 




DATED this / day of Fefe**a*y 2007. 
BY THE 
Approved as to form and content: 
Roger Bryner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 7th day of March, 2007,1 delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
Memorandum Decision, to the following 
Plaintiff, pro se 
Roger Bryner 
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd, #330 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Defendants 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
PO Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Court Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /S" day of February, 2007 I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served via first 
class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Roger Bryner 
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd. #330 
Midvale, UT 84047 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of February, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER to be served via first class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Roger Bryner 
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd. #330 
Midvale, UT 84047 
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